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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN TORT AND THE
MEANING OF "UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS"
DEFECTS
In Glass v. Ford Motor Co.' plaintiff had lost control of her car
because of an alleged metallurgical defect in a strut connected to the
car's steering mechanism. During the trial, controversy arose over a
jury instruction on strict liability. The instruction would have
predicated defendant's liability upon a showing by plaintiff of an
injury caused by a defect that rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous, and that arose out of the design, preparation, or manu-
facture of the car while in the control of the manufacturer.2 Plaintiff
maintained that the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement was
improper.
On appeal, a New Jersey court rejected this formulation of strict
liability, which was essentially drawn from section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. 3 The court reasoned that to require
the jury to weigh the "reasonableness" of the defect was to revert to
negligence, with its "reasonably prudent man" standards, considera-
tions of due care, and notions of fault. This negates the rationale
of pure strict liability-getting the injured consumer to the jury with-
out the burden of proving such considerations. 4 The court then
1. 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973).
2. Id. at 601, 304 A.2d at 563-64.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as §
402A]. § 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
(Emphasis added.)
4. 123 N.J. Super. at 602-03, 304 A.2d at 564.
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concluded that the "unreasonably dangerous" language had never
been expressly adopted in New Jersey and that it was therefore free
to purge this element from that state's strict liability formulation.5
Glass introduces an issue over which the authorities have split: the
meaning and purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement.
Is it an additional element that raises the degree of danger necessary
before recovery in strict liability will be allowed, or does it merely
qualify and lend emphasis to the meaning of the preceding element
of "defect?"6 The judicial response to this issue has been varied and
inconsistent, resulting in the establishment of a continuum that
spans the two polar positions.
Strict products liability in tort is a relatively recent doctrine that
developed contemporaneously with the increased consumer conscious-
ness of the American public beginning in the mid-1960's. Its purpose
was to enable the injured consumer to circumvent many of the ob-
stacles that earlier legal doctrines had posed.7 Prior thereto, recovery
for injuries caused by defective products was based on a number of
variations of two basic theories: (1) negligence and (2) contractual
warranty - both express and implied." The turning point for products
liability occurred in 1960 in the landmark New Jersey case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.9 The case was significant in two
5. Id. at 603, 304 A.2d at 564-65.
6. The latter position would hold that the term "unreasonably dangerous"
merely serves to indicate that many products have inherent generic qualities that
are potentially dangerous and should not be considered as defects and that some-
thing beyond these peculiar characteristics is required.
7. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); State Stove MZfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113, 120 (Miss. 1966); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484, 256 A.2d 153,
156 (1969); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 201 N.W.2d 825, 827(1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967);
63 Am. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 125 (1972); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1075 (1967).
8. The historical development of products liability leading up to and culminating
in strict liability in tort has been the subject of numerous commentaries; therefore,
extensive review here is not necessary. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960).
9. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In Henningsen plaintiff was injured




respects; henceforth, liability would be extended to any manufacturer
who placed his product into the stream of commerce and promoted
it in the market,10 and privity to the original purchase would no
longer be necessary.1' But Henningsen was still a contract case, based
upon a theory of implied warranty.-
It was the confusion that surrounded the implied warranties in
contract, and the attempts to circumvent them, that caused the war-
ranty theory to give way to the simpler rule of strict liability in tort.13
The breakthrough came in the 1963 California case of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.14 Deciding that what was really strict
liability in tort had been hiding long enough behind the facade of
implied warranty, Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia5 laid down the rule that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."1 In discussing the elements required,
Greenman held: "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was suf-
ficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the [prod-
uct] in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made
the [product] unsafe for its intended use."' 7
Although strict liability was recognized in only a few jurisdictions
when the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) published the Restatement
of Torts (Second) 'S in 1965, the doctrine had sufficiently established
chased, a transaction to which the injured plaintiff had not been privy. See also
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TE LAw OF TORTS § 97, at 654 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. Prior to Henningsen, liability extended
only to the manufacturer of items for personal consumption, e.g., food and drugs.
See generally note 8 supra.
11. 32 N.J. at 413, 161 A.2d at 100.
12. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 97, at 656.
13. Id. § 98, at 656.
14. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman plaintiff was injured while using a multi-
purpose power tool as a lathe when the fasteners used to hold the wood in place
failed to hold, allowing the wood to strike plaintiff's forehead.
15. Justice Traynor had been urging the express adoption of strict liability
since 1944. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
16. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
17. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
18. R STATEMENT (SacoND) TORTS (1965).
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itself for the A.L.I. to incorporate what would become section 402A
into the final draft.19 Basically, strict liability, as formulated by sec-
tion 402A, incorporated and reflected the essence of the Greenman
doctrine; subsequently, many courts found no reason to distinguish
the two.
20
Contemporaneous with these developments was the adoption of
strict liability in tort in New Jersey. The case of Santor v. A &M
Karagheusian, Inc. 21 again placed New Jersey in the vanguard of the
products liability movement. This case was especially progressive
because it established strict liability by "leap-frogging" over the per-
sonal injury stage and applying the doctrine to economic property
losses. 2 2 The court, referring to and endorsing Greenman,23 predicated
manufacturer responsibility upon an enterprise liability foundation.
The court reasoned that the manufacturer who puts a product into
the stream of trade is in a better position to guard against possible
defects and to bear and distribute the resultant losses when they do
occur than is the individual consumer.24 Henceforth in New Jersey,
strict liability in tort would apply
[i]f the article is defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such articles are sold and used, and the defect
arose out of the design or manufacture or while the article was
in the control of the manufacturer, and it proximately causes in-
jury or damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected
consumer .... 25
This formulation is consistent with Glass to the extent that it re-
quires: (1) injury, (2) causation, and (3) a defect that arose while
19. See note 3 supra. See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
131 n.13, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160 n.13, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440 n.13 (1972).
20. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160-61,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440-41 (1972). See also Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. Rnv. 713, 720
(1970).
21. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). In Santor plaintiff bought a carpet
labeled by the manufacturer as "No. 1 grade." Plaintiff sued the manufacturer
when the carpeting failed to wear properly and unusual lines developed in the rug.
22. Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
23. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
24. Id. See also Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products
Liability Law, 20 DRAxE L. Rzv. 528, 531 (1971) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 19-20 (1966).




under the manufacturer's control. Note, however, that the element
of defect does not stand alone, but is subject to the qualification that
it be "not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
articles are sold and used .... "2 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey expounded on this qualification
two days later in another leading case that approached the Restate-
ment standard. - In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,28 addressing itself
to the contention that strict liability, as formulated in Santor, would
virtually make insurers of contractors and manufacturers, the court
indicated: "That is not at all so, for the injured party would
clearly have the burden of establishing that the [product] was defective
when constructed and sold and that the defect proximately caused
the injury. In determining whether the [product] was defective, the
test admittedly would be reasonableness rather than perfection."29
Subsequent New Jersey cases have reaffirmed the Santor-Schipper posi-
tion, often relying expressly on section 402A for support, if not
actually applying its standard.30
26. Id. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
27. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV.
692, 702 (1965). The author states:
It should be immediately noted that the Restatement provision refers to a
product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Does this mean
that the Restatement rule adds a requirement to the strict liability rule
enunciated by Justice Francis [in Santor]? Probably not. In Jakubowski v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg., [42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964),] Justice
Proctor uses the phrases, "defective," "not reasonably fit for the purposes
intended," and "unreasonably dangerous," interchangeably, thus suggesting
that they are synonymous in the court's mind.
28. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). In Schipper infant plaintiff was scalded
as a result of a building contractor installing a hot water heater lacking a tem-
pering device. Schipper, like Santor, endorsed and predicated its holding upon the
Greenman doctrine. Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
29. Id. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326 (emphasis added). See also Dickerson, Products
Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967).
The author suggests that the test of Schipper is consistent with the Restatement.
Id. at 320.
30. For a good general review of the historical development of strict liability
in New Jersey see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973)
(concluding that New Jersey case law to date is generally in accord with the
Restatement). See Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 519, 280 A.2d
241, 244 (L. Div. 1971) (stating that § 402A has been adopted verbatim in New
Jersey as the basis for actions sounding in strict liability in tort). But see Finnegan
v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) (rejecting § 402A(I) (b)
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It is in this context that the court in Glass adopted section 402A
on strict liability but without the phrase "unreasonably dangerous."
The court apparently viewed section 402A as encompassing an ex-
pression of strict liability in tort that is internally inconsistent. Theo-
retically, strict liability is antithetical to negligence because plaintiff-
consumer's conduct, regarding due care and behaving with the know-
ledge and expectations of a reasonably prudent man, is largely, if not
totally, irrelevant.82 Yet the Restatement defines "unreasonably dan-
gerous" in terms of a deviation from the normal expectations of a prod-
uct's performance and inherent risks as contemplated by an ordinary
consumer acting with a knowledge of the product deemed common to
the community.33 The court reasoned that this definition could pos-
sibly defeat an injured consumer's claim for recovery if a manufacturer
showed that the consumer failed to act in accordance with what
amounts to a due care standard.34 The inconsistency, as even the
Restatement acknowledges, is that this action under section 402A
is not predicated on negligence, and an ordinary breach of due care
by plaintiff should not defeat his recovery.35
to the extent it exempts the manufacturer who contemplates a substantial change
in his product before reaching the ultimate consumer); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
31. 123 N.J. Super. at 602, 304 A.2d at 564; accord, Williams v. Ford Motor
Co., 454 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121
N.J. Super. 299, 309, 296 A.2d 668, 673 (L. Div. 1972). Note, however, that the
Brody and Glass decisions were written by the same judge. But see Hall v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Lamendola v.
Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 518, 280 A.2d 241, 243 (L. Div. 1971); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967).
32. Cf. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd
mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 87, 207 A.2d 314, 323 (1965). Contra, Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520,
523, 460 P.2d 191, 193 (1969).
33. § 402A, comment i, states: "The article sold must be dangerous to an ex-
tent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
34. 123 N.J. Super, at 602, 304 A.2d at 564; accord, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
The Glass court relied extensively on Cronin, frequently referring to it for support
and in-depth analysis.
35. § 402A, comment n at 356; see Note, Products Liability and Section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 302 (1966). Contra, Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). See generally Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Sweeny v. Mat-




Theoretically, Glass seems logically consistent in arguing that "un-
reasonably dangerous" should not be used to introduce negligence
into strict liability tort theory. The difference between Glass and
those cases following the Restatement is one of application and social
policy. Schipper- and a number of other authorities have held that
a manufacturer is not an insurer and is not liable for all injuries
stemming from the use of his product.37 The question therefore be-
comes one of devising a standard that will equitably distribute the
losses between the consumer and the manufacturer. In striking this
balance, courts have taken varying and sometimes conflicting views
on how far liability should be removed from negligence or, viewing
the question from the other pole, on how far liability may be removed
from absolute liability based upon an analysis of causation problems.
A number of courts have taken the position that strict liability is
only one step removed from negligence, the sole difference being
that the element of scienter is no longer relevant.3 8 Given this line of
reasoning, strict liability merely relieves the injured consumer from
having to point out and prove a specific act of negligence.39 That is,
once injury, defect and causation are established, a presumption of
negligence per se arises as a matter of law.40 Once established, how-
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426-27, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970); Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. 1969); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454
S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
36. 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326.
37. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) ; Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83,
93, 179 N.W.2d 64, 70 (1970) ; State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113,
120 (Miss. 1966); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484, 256 A.2d 153, 156
(1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967);
PRO>Sr.R, supra note 9, § 79, at 517; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rav. 363, 366 (1965);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1066 (1967).
38. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d
307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968);
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966); Wade, supra
note 7, at 15 n.2; cf. James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs:
Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1550, 1555 (1966).
39. See text at note 7 supra.
40. Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 201 N.W.2d 825, 828 (1972).
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ever, the traditional ground rules of negligence apply, and notions of
foreseeability,41 intervening agency,4 2 and plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence4 3 all apply as in an ordinary negligence action.44 This position
represents the very approach that the Glass court feared-the tendency
to relegate strict liability to the status of an offshoot of negligence
theory instead of having its own independent identity.
The Restatement's position is that strict liability is distinct from
negligence. Plaintiff's conduct, as to defenses, will only defeat his
recovery when he "assumes the risk" - i.e., he subjectively is aware
of the risk and appreciates its danger and yet continues to use the
product in light of his subjective realization.45 It is not enough that
plaintiff failed to discover and guard against the defect, even though
a reasonably prudent man would have done so.4
Other courts, adhering more to the Restatement position, have
preferred to limit liability and prevent the manufacturer from be-
coming an insurer by methods that avoid traditional negligence
doctrines as much as possible. Generally, this approach has centered
around the question of how broadly the concept of "defect" is to be
defined. The fact that an injury has occurred through the use of a
product should not automatically result in manufacturer liability.
No court has imposed what amounts to absolute liability based upon
mere causation without more.47 Courts have refused to label the in-
herent characteristics of a product-often the ones that lend the
product its very utility and identity-as defects. 4 8
41. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 586, 97
Cal. Rptr. 798, 808-09 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp.
142, 149-50, 214 A.2d 694, 698 (Super. Ct. 1965). But see Howes v. Hansen, 56
Wis. 2d 247, 259, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (1972).
42. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 8, at 826. See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Eads, 224 Tenn. 473, 482-84, 457 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (1970).
43. Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 574, 214 A.2d 18, 20 (1965);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1967).
44. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see text at note 39 supra.
45. § 402A, comment n at 356.
46. Id.
47. See cases cited note 60 infra; Dickerson, supra note 29, at 302.
48. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967); Tray-




There has also been hesitancy to impose liability because a normally
wholesome quality, for which a product is used and desired, can
cause some detrimental effect when consumed or used to excess. 49
The same reasoning has been extended to cover situations in
which the aggregate gross effect, or the effect of individual use
over an extended period of time, has resulted in injury.50 Courts
have also limited liability by holding the consumer to a certain mini-
nal level of common knowledge, though less than the standard ex-
pected of a reasonably prudent man.5' Some courts have also restricted
liability when injury is not caused by a defect in the product but
by a peculiar idiosyncrasy or allergy of the consumer that results in a
harmful reaction. 2 Finally, courts have generally restricted liability
when the product, because of its natural, inherent qualities or because
of the laws of physics and chemistry, is theoretically incapable of being
produced in a defect-free state, yet still possesses social utility.53
social utility of such products see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). The classic example
of a product whose very utility renders it dangerous is a knife. The very purpose
for a knife's existence is to cut objects; without its dangerous characteristic of
sharpness it is useless. To label that quality a "defect" is to subvert the meaning
of the word and would lead to absurd results that would pervert the purpose of
strict liability. That one may cut himself as a result of his own carelessness cannot
be said to incur liability upon the manufacturer. 331 F. Supp. at 759. On the
other hand, consider the user of a pocket knife who cuts himself because a faulty
catch fails to hold the blade in the closed position.
49. The reasoning seems to be that anything in excess of moderation can be
dangerous. § 402A, comment i, provides the example of wholesome whiskey used
to excess resulting in the attendant ills.
50. See City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding that the aggregate pollution of all the cars operating in Chicago
does not mean that any particular car is defective for the purpose of strict liability).
See also Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M.
1971) (denying recovery to an insulation worker who claimed that the hazardous
character of asbestos-insulation materials caused him to contact asbestosis over a
20-year period). For a discussion of long-term cigarette smoking and strict liability
see James, supra note 38.
51. Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ili. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (holding that
just because shoes may become slippery when wet does not mean they are de-
fective). The court held that this is an everyday hazard of life for which common
knowledge is presumed.
52. See Oakes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77
Cal. Rptr. 709 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
53. E~g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). For a
discussion of the classic example of the Pasteur rabies treatment, which al-
though made exactly as intended may still result in death, see § 402A, comment k.
1974]
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After defining what qualities, characteristics and injuries are
associated with products that cannot be said to be defective or de-
fect-related, the courts have then turned to those products that may
be called "defective" for strict liability purposes. In so doing, these
courts, as opposed to those that have limited strict liability by the
interjection of negligence doctrines, have often added one more quali-
fication to the concept of defect-the "unreasonably dangerous"
language of the Restatement. Thus, the question becomes whether
strict liability may now be said to turn on a two-fold standards4 re-
quiring that the product be both defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous.
Unfortunately, it has often been difficult to tell which position a
court is taking because of the semantical problems that pervade this
area. Some courts, once they find a defect, talk about it in terms
of being "unreasonably dangerous" merely to emphasize the great risk
involved, though it is unnecessary to establish risk of such magnitude
in order to recover.55 Nonetheless, a number of courts have demanded
Yet, with this kind of product, the courts have usually been willing to apply a
balancing test of risk against social utility. In the case of the rabies vaccine, the
decision to exempt the manufacturer from liability is easily justified in light of
the fact that the alternative of not using the vaccine is certain death. Elsewhere
in this area, there has been some split of opinion on how to reconcile the un-
avoidably unsafe product with strict liability. Some courts have held that when a
product possessing social utility (i.e., drugs, chemicals and cosmetic products) is
unavoidably unsafe even though manufactured exactly as intended, that product
is not defective as a matter of law. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d
841, 855 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968). Other authorities
have held that a full and complete warning apprising the consumer of the risks
involved is necessary to protect the manufacturer from an initial presumption of
liability. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Oakes
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969); § 402A, comment j at 353. Contra, Cunningham v. Mac-
Neal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Brody v. Overlook
Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (L. Div. 1972). These are the so-called
"blood-plasma" cases, in which strict liability was imposed upon the supplier of
blood, contaminated with hepatitis virus, for transfusions notwithstanding the
fact that there is no known test for the detection of such viral contamination.
These cases may be reconciled, however, because wholesome, virus-free blood
does exist in reality, and a tighter, more effective screening of donors is within
the control of suppliers.
54. See generally Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d
1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Note, Products Liability and Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts, supra note 35, at 296.
55. Cf. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465
(1966); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga




a finding of "unreasonably dangerous" as an independent require-
ment.-' O Other courts merely use "unreasonably dangerous" to denote
that a defect must be more than just an inherent risk. The position
of the Glass court is to reject the "unreasonably dangerous" language,
especially to the extent that it represents an independent element, al-
though the court would prefer to avoid the confusion associated with
that phrase altogether.
Even the Restatement uses the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase
ambiguously. On one hand, comment i discusses the phrase in terms
of the expectations and evaluations of the ordinary consumer.5 7
On the other hand, it gives examples of products that reflect con-
siderations that are fixed by nature and inherent in the product's
daracter, totally independent of human expectation, evaluation or
judgment. Both Dean Prosser and Justice Traynor, respectively the
reporter and the adviser to section 402A, thought the purpose of "un-
reasonably dangerous" was to exempt from liability the manufacturer
of those products with generic and inherent possibilities for harm.5 9
Finally, those cases exemplified by Greenman, into which Glass
falls, apply strict liability without considering the "unreasonably
dangerous" qualification.- Instead of qualifying a defect in terms of
the average consumer's expectations and judgment of the product's
danger, as does the Restatement, these courts have defined defect in
terms of the product's fitness for the ordinary purposes for which it is
sold and used.' Such an approach assumes, ab initio, that a product
is not to be held defective merely because of its inherent, generic
qualities or capacity for abuse. For such courts, justice is served with-
56. E.g., Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 148, 214 A.2d 694, 698
(Super. Ct. 1965); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968); Farr v. Arm-
strong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Magnuson v. Rupp
Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969); Elliott v. Lachance, 109
N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522,
452 P.2d 729 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
57. See note 33 supra.
58. For example, comment i refers to whiskey, sugar and butter.
59. Prosser, supra note 24, at 23; Traynor, supra note 37, at 373.
60. E.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969);
Santor %v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
61. See text at note 25 supra.
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out making the manufacturer an absolute insurer by requiring that,
in addition to proving injury and causation, plaintiff demonstrate
a defect in the strict sense of the word.
62
Coming full circle back to Glass, it should be clear that the area
of strict liability, perhaps because of its unusually rapid and hap-
hazard development, has attained varying degrees of acceptance, with
divergent, sometimes inconsistent, interpretations. A number of courts
have been unwilling to cut the ties with negligence theory, the result
being hybrid cases that are not really strict liability in the true sense
of the term. Then there are the courts that operate within the context
of strict liability, who, in the interest of preventing the manufacturer
from becoming an absolute insurer, have manipulated the conceptual
definition of defect to this end. Within this latter group, some courts
have adopted the Restatement's element of "unreasonably dangerous"
as an additional qualification upon defect. Others have rejected this
interpretation, contending that if "unreasonably dangerous" is to be
used at all, it should merely serve to remind that the defect must be
something other than a generic quality inherent in the product. But
some courts would deny "unreasonably dangerous" even this function,
preferring to take judicial notice that generic qualities are not defects.
It is very difficult to reconcile these divergent cases except at the
broadest levels. Ultimately, the only apparent common denominator
running through these cases is the desire to prevent manufacturer
liability based upon mere causation alone without proof of some
kind of defect.63 Of course, it has been contended that despite these
theoretical and philosophical differences surrounding the meaning
of "unreasonably dangerous" the result in practice has rarely been
any different. After all, if a defect is substantial enough to cause
62. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214
(Fla. 1968); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967); Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Kerr v. Coming
Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969). See also Carmichael, supra
note 24, at 539; Traynor, supra note 37, at 366-67.
63. Traynor, supra note 37, at 366-67.
64. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d
307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
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an injury, is it not therefore an "unreasonably dangerous" defect?6 5
As to the impact of Glass in this area, the most that can be said is
that it presents another opportunity to re-examine the semantical
problems that pervade the theory of strict products liability in tort.
The case rejects "unreasonably dangerous" to the extent that it makes
the ordinary consumer's expectations about a product's dangerous
qualities irrelevant. Unfortunately, the mere deletion of a phrase
laden with so many varying interpretations represents an inadequate
and oversimplified response that fails to reconcile most of these diffi-
culties.
Stuart Jay Radloff
65. See Newnark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702
(1969), commented upon in Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Truck Corp., 111
NJ. Super. 383, 388 n.2, 268 A.2d 345, 348 n.2 (L. Div. 1970).
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